Labor and Employment Law by McCormick, Robert A.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-1999
Labor and Employment Law
Robert A. McCormick
Michigan State University College of Law, mccorm52@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. McCormick, Labor and Employment Law, 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 261 (1999).
HeinOnline -- 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 261 1999
LABORANDEMWLOYMrnNTLAW 
Robert A. McCormick" 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 
I. CASES AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 262 
A. NLRB v. Taylor Machine Products, Inc ................. 262 
B. Arrow Electric Co., Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
C. Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB and Grancare, 
Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 
D. Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 
E. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 
F. Caney Creek Coal Co. v. Satterfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 
INTRODUCTION 
As was pointed out in earlier survey articles, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit has often reversed or substantially modified the decisions 
of the National Labor Relations Board (''NLRB" or ''the Board") as well as 
other agencies. This court's labor and employment decisions during the 1998 
term for the most part continue this pattern. 
This article will discuss several significant decisions made by the circuit 
court interpreting the NLRA and other employment-related statutes. While 
the court made some important rulings in this area, especially regarding the 
nature of concerted activity, it did not alter its traditionally skeptical view of 
NLRB decisions. 
The court addressed five main subjects in labor law this last year: the 
appropriateness of the bargaining order remedy; the reach of section 7 of the 
NLRA and the nature of concerted activity, whether nurses are supervisors, 
the nature of concerted activity, and the issue of employee benefits, most 
notably under the Black Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA"). 1 With respect to this 
last issue, the court, after hearing a remarkable seven cases2 involving the 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University- Detroit College of Law. The author 
would like to thank Kevin J. Elias, Michigan State University- Detroit College of Law, class 
of 1999 for his able assistance in the preparation of this article. 
I. 30 u.s.c. §§ 901-945 (1994). 
2. See Robbins v. Cyprus Cumberland Coal Co., 146 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1998); Caney 
Creek Coal Co. v. Satterfield, 150 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1998); Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 
502 (6th Cir. 1998); Cunningham v. Island Creek Coal Co., 144 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Peabody Coal Co. v. Ferguson, 140 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Peabody Coal Co. v. White, 135 
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BLBA in one year, ruled only once in favor of the individual coal miner to 
recover benefits under the BLBA. Throughout most of the decisions, the court 
cited congressional intent to liberalize the black lung requirements to make 
recovery easier,3 but restricted recovery to a limited and technical definition. 
I. CASES AND ANALYSIS 
A. NLRB v. Taylor Machine Products, Inc. 4 
The central question in this case surrounded the Board's authority to 
issue a bargaining order particularly after a lengthy lapse of time. Taylor 
Machine Products (''the Employer") produces and sells small brass and steel 
parts to American automakers.5 The company operates two distinct 
manufacturing processes: in the so-called "core" operation, parts are shaped 
and cut, while in the "secondary" operation, the remaining aspects of the 
manufacturing process are completed. Prior to August 6, 1992, the Company 
housed both operations at its only plant located in Taylor, Michigan.6 
In January of 1992, the Local Lodge 82, District Lodge 60, International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC ("The 
Union") started an organizing campaign among Taylor's fifty-eight production 
and maintenance employees.7 During that campaign, thirty-nine employees 
signed a petition authorizing the union to represent them in collective 
bargaining. On March 25, 1992, a majority of employees voted in favor of the 
Union.8 
Taylor objected to the pre-election conduct of the Union, alleging that 
Union supporters had harassed and threatened employees opposed to the 
Union and had vandalized property owned by anti-union workers.9 The 
Acting Regional Director set aside the election and ordered a new election, but 
held the order in abeyance pending the outcome of the unfair labor practice 
charges lodged by the Union against the Employer. 10 
F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1998); Creek Coal Co. v. Bates, 134 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 1997)(this case was 
originally an unpublished opinion). 
3. See, e.g., Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1998)(regarding adetai1ed 
discussion on congressional intent). This case will be discussed in detail in Part I.E of this 
article. 
4. 136 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1998). 
5. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 510. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 510. 
10. See id. 
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The Union alleged that Taylor, through its supervisors, had coerced 
employees in violation of section 8(a)(l) of the Labor Management Relations 
Act ("the Act"Y 1 and had terminated employees in violation of section 8( a )(3) 
as well. 12 The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Taylor 
threatened employees with termination if the Union won the election, illegally 
interrogated Union supporters, implemented an unlawfully restrictive rule 
prohibiting the distribution of literature in non-work areas, and allowed 
harassment of pro-Union employees by anti-Union employees. 13 The ALJ also 
found that Taylor had breached section 8(a)(l) ofthe Act by permitting anti-
union employees to harass pro-Union women}4 In addition, the ALJ found 
that Taylor violated section 8(a)(3) by transferring its secondary operations 
unit to a new facility in Kentucky and then discharging six female pro-union 
employees in that unit. Among the proposed remedies for these violations, the 
ALJ ordered Taylor to recognize the Union, collectively bargain with it and 
transfer its secondary operations back to Taylor, Michigan from its Kentucky 
facility. 15 
The Board adopted the ALJ's findings of facts and conclusions oflaw in 
an order dated July 21, 1995}6 More than one year later, on August 2, 1996, 
the Board applied to the court of appeals to enforce its order. 17 Taylor 
objected on several grounds including that the long delay in seeking 
enforcement barred its enforcement under the equitable doctrine of laches. 18 
With regard to the argument that delay barred enforcement of the order, the 
court held that the Act does not impose strict time limits within which the 
Board must seek enforcement of an order under § 1 0( c) of the Act, and 
furthermore, that the delay had not prejudiced Taylor or given the Board an 
unfair advantage. 19 "Absent such a change in the relative positions of the 
parties," the court ruled that, "the doctrine of laches will not apply."20 
While the court of appeals sustained the Board's determination that 
Taylor's decisions to relocate secondary operations and discharge six 
employees violated the Act, the court refused to enforce the Board's 
11. 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1994). 
12. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 510-11. 
13. See id. at 511. 
14. See id. at 512. 
15. See id. at 512-13. Taylor had transferred the secondary operations unit to Kentucky 
in an attempt to defeat the certification of the Union. See id. 
16. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 513. 
17. See id. at 513-14. 
18. See id. at 513. 
19. See id. at 514. 
20. Taylor, 136 F.3d at 514. (quoting NLRB v. Michigan Rubber Products, Inc., 738 
F.2d ll1, 113 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
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bargaining order.21 The Board had concluded that Taylor committed a large 
number of unfair labor practices, including threats of job loss and plant 
closure. 22 The situation worsened, the Board determined, when the secondary 
operations were transferred to Kentucky.23 This latter conduct, the Board 
found, "is the sort of drastic measure certain to live on in the lore of the shop 
and to exert a substantial coercive effect on any employee-current or 
subsequently hired-considering voting for the Union in a new election."24 
While the court of appeals is statutorily bound to review enforcement 
orders under the abuse of discretion standard, 25 the court in this instance 
closely scrutinized the Board's decision to impose the bargaining order.26 The 
court stated that the Board had not explained why other, less drastic remedies, 
including reinstatement of discharged employees, relocation of secondary 
operations to the Taylor facility and a cease and desist order, would be 
insufficientto remedy the situation.27 The court observed that Taylor's threats 
took place before the Union won the election and noted that the Board had 
failed to consider the fact that the union-won election had to be set aside 
because of misconduct by union supporters.28 The court stated it could find 
no other case in which the Board had set aside an election for Union related 
misconduct and then issued a bargaining order.29 Thus, the bargaining order 
was set aside.30 
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, however, Judge Jones 
concluded that the bargaining order was appropriate.31 The totality of 
Taylor's actions, he reasoned, outweighed the minor allegations of misconduct 
by Union supporters.32 While he recognized that the majority of Taylor's 
actions were committed before the election, the most egregious of them, 
especially the move of the secondary operations to Kentucky, occurred after 
the election.33 Notwithstanding these observations, however, a majority of the 
court refused to require that Taylor recognize and bargain with the union.34 
21. See id. at 518-20. 
22. See id. 519. 
23. See id. 
24. Taylor, 136 F.3d at 519. (quoting the ruling of the Board). 
25. See NLRB v. Kentucky May Coal Co., 89 F.3d 1235, 1243 (6th Cir. 1996)( citation 
omitted). 
26. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 519. 
27. See id. at 520. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 520. 
31. See id. at 520-21 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
32. See id. at 520. 
33. See id. at 521. 
34. See Taylor, 136 F.3d at 520. 
HeinOnline -- 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 265 1999
1999] Labor and Employment Law 265 
B. Arrow Electric Co. v. NLRB35 
This case· represented the one instance in which the court of appeals 
broadly deferred to the Board's judgment with respect to the reach of section 
7 of the NLRA. On February 27, 1996, four employees of Arrow Electric Co. 
("Arrow") walked off the job to protest the actions of one of their supervisors, 
Sonny Collins. 36 The four were subsequently dismissed. The Board found the 
discharges to have violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act and ordered the 
reinstatement of the employees.37 On appeal, Arrow contended that the 
organized walkout was not protected under § 7 of the NLRA and that the 
employees were discharged for violating established company policy by 
leaving work without permission.38 
The problems at Arrow arose from complaints by employees regarding 
Mr. Collins' allegedly belligerent attitude, disrespectful and demeaning 
comments to employees, specific instances of threatening to withhold a 
paycheck and "sneaking around" the site to observe the employees and 
comment negatively on their job performance.39 A supervisor, Donald 
Jefferies, had attempted to rectify the situation by conducting four meetings 
with the disgruntled workers. Mr. Collins attended the second meeting and 
apologized for his conduct, promising to "do better" in the future. Mr. 
Jefferies told the employees that if another problem arose, they should to 
contact him directly.40 
The following week Mr. Collins continued to harass the employees.41 
Remembering Mr. Jefferies' instructions, the four employees phoned, radioed 
and paged him without success. They then left the work site and drove to the 
shop in attempt to communicate with him in person. Since Mr. Jefferies was 
not at the shop when the employees arrived, they contacted the Personnel 
Director, Jessica Thompson, regarding Mr. Collins. Ms. Thompson told them 
to report for work on Monday morning. On Monday, the employees filled out 
a questionnaire detailing the actions of Mr. Collins, but the next day were 
terminated for "leaving the jobsite without notice."42 
35. 155 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 1998). 
36. See Arrow, 155 F.3d at 763-64. 
37. See id. at 765. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 764. 
40. See Arrow, 155 F.3d at 764. 
41. See id. 
42. /d. 
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The ALJ and the NLRB concluded that the employees' actions were 
protected under Section 7 of the Act and that their termination violated section 
8(a)( 1) of the Act.43 The essential question on appeal was whether the actions 
of the four employees were protected under section 7 of the Act and, if so, 
whether they were discharged due to their exercise of those rights in violation 
of section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Since the ALJ determined that the walkout was 
designed to remedy the negative impact of Collins' behavior on working 
conditions and productivity of the specific employees, he concluded that their 
actions were protected under section 7.44 The ALJ further found that Arrow 
was aware of Collins' actions and reacted by terminating the employees.45 
Since Arrow failed establish that it would have taken the same action 
regardless of whether the employees walked out, and did not offer an 
alternative reason for their termination, their discharges violated section 
8(a)(l) of the Act.46 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Washington 
Aluminum Co.,41 employees may protest working conditions, even without 
making a specific demand on the employer to remedy the condition.48 The 
Sixth Circuit has similarly ruled, in Vic Tanny International, Inc. v. NLRB,49 
that walkouts by employees to protest job conditions are protected activity 
under section 7 of the NLRA. 
In this instance, the court of appeals was persuaded that the employees 
had sought to bring to the attention of management their ongoing problems 
with Collins on more than one occasion and that their actions in driving to the 
shop to find someone to talk to were reasonable, especially given yet another 
confrontation with Collins and their failed attempts to reach Jeffries by other 
means.50 
Having determined that the employees were engaged in protected, 
concerted activity, the remaining question was whether those employees were 
fired for that activity or, as Arrow asserted, for violating an established work 
rule. In the court's view, Arrow did not demonstrate that the terminations 
would have occurred notwithstanding the employees' protected conduct. 5 1 In 
essence, the court relied on the concerted efforts of the Arrow employees on 
more than one occasion to bring to the attention of management the problems 
43. See id. 
44. See Arrow, 155 F.3d at 764. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. This paraphrased the ALl's opinion cited by the court. 
47. 370 u.s. 9 (1962). 
48. See Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 15. 
49. 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980). 
50. See Arrow, 155 F.3d at 766. 
51. See id. at 766-67. 
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caused by Mr. Collins' supervision. 52 For these reasons, the court of appeals 
affirmed the decisions of the ALJ and the Board.53 
The result of this ruling has further established employees' protected 
right to engage in concerted activity to protest adverse working conditions. 
Paradoxically, Mr. Jefferies, the man who availed himself to the four 
employees as a voice of reason and assurance that their grievance was taken 
seriously and without retaliation, had recommended to Arrow that the 
employees be discharged for walking off the job. 54 
C. Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRJ355; Grancare, Inc. v. NLRJ356 
These cases raised important and ongoing questions of law regarding 
whether licensed practical nurses ("LPN") are "supervisors" and therefore, 
outside the reach of the Act. As to this issue, the court of appeals has 
consistently ruled that LPNs and charge nurses ("CN") are supervisors. 57 For 
over a decade, however, the NLRB has regularly disagreed. This 
disagreement over the meaning of the Act has come to epitomize the 
longstanding conflict between the Board and the court. 
Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines a "supervisor" as any employee who 
exercises authority in one of the eleven statutorily listed areas, exercises 
authority in the interests of the employer, and uses independent judgment in 
the exercise of their authority.58 It is the exercise of independent judgment, 
as well as the frequency of authority used, that constitutes the difference 
between the NLRB's and the court's view of the supervisory status ofLPNs 
andCNs. 
In essence, the NLRB's position regarding LPNs and CNs is that if their 
exercise of independent judgment is sporadic or isolated, or their decisions 
are subject to review, such job duties are insufficient to confer supervisory 
status.59 In most cases, LPNs and CNs responsibilities include directing aides 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 767 
54. See Arrow, 155 F.3d at 767 (citation omitted). 
55. 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998). 
56. 137 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1998). 
57. Seegeneral/yGrancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 137 F.3d 372 (6th Cir.l998); Caremore, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997); Manor West, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 1195 (6th Cir. 
1995); Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992); NLRB v. Beacon Light 
Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). 
58. See Caremore, 129 F. 3d at 369. 
59. See id. (citing Beverly California Corp., v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1550, n.3 (6th 
Cir. 1992); NLRB Medina County Publications, Inc., 735 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1984); 
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regarding "aspects of patient care."60 In addition, they may request off-duty 
aides to come in to work, or request on-duty aides to work overtime, and they 
may recommend aides be disciplined with such suggestion being strongly 
considered by nurses' supervisors.61 
The NLRB has consistently concluded in these cases that although nurses 
may exercise this power, they do not do so with real independentjudgment.62 
That is, their judgments are subject to review and they possess no real 
authority.63 The Board, also, has attempted to shift the burden of proving 
supervisory status from the NLRB to the employer.64 With the exception of 
Justices Moore and Jones, who stated in Grancare that it was reasonable 
under the Act for the NLRB to shift this burden of proof, it is a concept the 
Sixth Circuit has consistently rejected.65 
In Mid-America, LPNS and CNS evaluated nursing assistants' 
performances and recommended to the Administrator whether or not an 
assistant should be dismissed after an initial period of employment.66 They 
also supervised employees to some degree and handled problems outside the 
nursing department during the afternoon and night shifts. 67 Based upon this 
evidence, the court found LPNs and CNs to be supervisors within the 
meaning of the Act and refused to defer to the Board's contrary determination 
as to the meaning of the phrase "independent judgement. "68 Thus, the Board's 
order WaS vacated. 
In Grancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 69 the court faced the same issue whether CN' s 
are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. As in Mid-America, the facts 
showed that CN s are the highest authority in the facility during the night shift 
and, for the most part, on weekends.70 Their job description includes 
supervising nursing and ancillary personnel, implementing nursing care plans, 
participating in progressive discipline and orientation, monitoring and 
assisting in evaluation of nursing staff performance, assigning staffbased on 
Fedeml Compress & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 1968)). 
60. ld. 
61. See id. at 369-70. 
62. See Caremore, 129 F.3d at 371. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 375. 
65. See id. at 377 (Jones, J., concurring); see also id. (Moore, J., concurring). 
66. See Mid-America, 148 F.3d at 639-40. 
67. See id. at 640. 
68. See id. at 641-43. 
69. 137 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998). 
70. See Grancare, 137 F.Jd at 374. 
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facility needs, approving overtime and sending employees home as 
necessary. 71 
Notwithstanding this list of duties, however, the NLRB had found that 
CNs use of this supervisory authority was sporadic.72 For instance, of twenty-
one documents offered as evidence that LPNs have authority to discipline, 
only five showed that some discipline was given.73 Based on this and similar 
evidence, the Regional Director concluded that "[a]t best, the exhibits 
represent isolated incidents of supervision insufficient to elevate the nurses as 
a whole to supervisory level."74 
In Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB,1s the court noted that for the fourth time in 
the decade, the court was being called upon to revisit the question whether, 
and under what circumstances, nurses qualify as supervisors under the act.76 
In this case, like the others, entire shifts were supervised by LPN s and aides 
with no Administrator present.77 While LPNs spent most of their time 
providing direct patient care, they were also called upon to assign or provide 
direction to aides in certain circumstances. For example, they assigned aides 
to particular patients, called in off duty aides, evaluated and disciplined aides, 
and filed disciplinary notices relating to aides. In concluding they were not 
supervisors, the NLRB again relied in large part on the idea that they 
exercised authority only in "sporadic or isolated instances."78 
The court strongly disagreed with the Board's view of the matter. On the 
contrary, it stated that "[i]t is the existence of [disciplinary] authority that 
counts under the statute, and not the frequency of its exercise."79 Because at 
least one of the defmitional elements of the statute was satisfied, the court 
concluded that the respondent's charge nurses are "supervisors" and vacated 
the orders of the Board.80 
This difference of opinion as to the meaning of supervisory status in the 
nursing profession has kept the NLRB and the court at odds for nearly a 
decade. Frustrated with the NLRB's refusal to accept its precedent on this 
issue, the court of appeals in 1998 utilized their decisions to emphatically 
remind the Board of its views on the subject. A few quotes from the court's 
ruling in Care more will illuminate this author's view of the level of tension 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 375-76. 
73. See id. at 376. 
74. Grancare, 137 F.3d at 576. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
75. 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997). 
76. 129 F.3d at 366. 
77. See id. at 376. 
78. ld. at 368. 
79. ld. at 369 (quoting Beverly California Corp., 970 F.2d at 1550, n.3). 
80. See Beverly California, 970 F.2d at 1550. 
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between the NLRB and the Sixth Circuit in this area. In one instance the court 
wrote, "[ w ]e therefore have had to admonish the NLRB for choosing not 'to 
follow the law of this Circuit' and repeatedly to 'remind the [NLRB] that it is 
the courts, and not the [NLRB], who bear the final responsibility for 
interpreting the law. "'81 In addition, the court stated that the NLRB continues 
to misapprehend both the law and its own place in the legal system, ... 
[nurses] are supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA."82 Indeed, to 
further emphasize their position, the appeals court awarded costs and 
attorneys' fees in Caremore.83 
D. Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agenc)l4 
For the last four years, employees at the Detroit Newspaper Agency 
("Agency")85 have been engaged in a protracted and highly contentious work 
stoppage. The Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press bargaining together 
under a joint operating agreement,86 entered into three-year collective 
bargaining agreement with ten different collective bargaining units. By April 
30, 1995, the partnership had reached new agreements with four of these 
units.87 In July 1995, however, the remaining six went out on strike and the 
Agency hired approximately 1,280 employees to replace the more than 2,000 
that initially struck. 88 
In 1995, the striking Unions lodged unfair labor practices charges and 
the NLRB issued complaints asserting that the strike had been caused by the 
papers' unfair labor practices.89 In June, 1997, the ALJ ruled that the strike 
was an unfair labor practice strike.90 In the meantime, in February, 1997, the 
unions offered unconditionally to return to work, but the papers, maintaining 
that the work stoppage was prompted by economic considerations and not by 
unfair labor practices, refused to discharge the permane~t replacements and 
81. Caremore, 129 F.3d at 371. 
82. Jd 
83. See id. 
84. 154 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998) 
85. The Detroit Newspaper Agency is a partnership consisting of the non-editorial 
departments of both the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press. The editorial departments 
remain separate entities. See Schaub, 154 F.3d at 277. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 277-78. 
90. See id. at 278. 
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reinstate the striking employees.91 Instead, they placed such employees on a 
preferential hiring list for positions as they became available.92 
On July 2, 1997, the Regional Director, William Schaub, petitioned the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for injunctive relief 
under§ 1 O(j) of the Act.93 The NLRB took the position that the continued use 
of replacement workers, in lieu of strikers, would "irreparably damage the 
integrity of the collective bargaining process and [might] ultimately result in 
an irreparable dissipation of employee support for the Unions."94 The district 
court denied the request and the decision was appealed.95 
Injunctive relief of the sort sought by the NLRB may not be granted 
under the Act unless the court finds reasonable cause to believe that the 
alleged unfair labor practice occurred and the relief sought would be ''just and 
proper" under the circumstances.% On appeal, the Sixth Circuit deferred to 
the discretion of the district court's judgment that issuance of the degree failed 
the "just and proper" aspect.97 In the appellate court's view, ''the relief to be 
granted is only that reasonably necessary to preserve the ultimate remedial 
power of the Board and is not to be a substitute for the exercise of that 
power."98 Put differently, if the Board's remedial powers would be effective 
without the use of the extraordinary relief, the injunction will not issue. 
As to the NLRB 's argument that refusal to issue the injunction will create 
an impediment to collective bargaining, the court noted that bargaining had 
continued and that the district court was not necessarily wrong in rejecting this 
claim.99 As to the NLRB's other claim that the injunction is necessary to 
prevent further "scattering" of employees, the court found such an assertion 
to be speculative.100 For these reasons, the court concluded that the denial of 
the injunction was not an abuse of discretion. 101 
91. See Schaub, 154 F.3d at 278. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. Jd. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
95. See Schaub, 154 F.3d at 278. 
96. See id. at 78-79 (citations omitted). 
97. See id. at 279-80. 
98. Jd. at 279 (quoting Gottfried v. Frankel, 818 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
99. See Schaub, 154 F.3d at 279. 
l 00. See id. at 280. 
101. See id. 
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E. Glen Coal Co. v. Sea/s 102 
During its 1998 term, the Sixth Circuit heard an unusually high number 
of cases involving the BLBA. In each instance, the court either shifted the 
burden of payments or denied or restricted benefits, and with the exception of 
Caney Creek Coal Co. v. Satterfield, 103discussed below, the court in each case 
ruled contrary to the claim of the coal miner. 
In this matter, an employee of Glen Coal Co. ("Glen Coal"), Jess Seals, 
requested benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 104 as a result of his 
having contracted pneumoconiosis. Initially, Old Republic Insurance 
Company ("Old Republic"), the insurer of Glen Coal, honored Seals' 
disability request and awarded benefits. 10s Thereafter, however, questions 
arose as to the legitimacy of Seal's eligibility under the BLBA. 106 The ALJ 
ordered the continuation of benefits, regardless of the legitimacy, since 
recognition of disability satisfies the requirements under the BLBA. 107 The 
ALJ relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision108 in Doris Coal Co. v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of 
Labor. 109 
The BLBA was enacted to provide benefits to coal miners who are totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of miners 
whose death was due to such illness. 110 Pneumoconiosis is a "chronic dust 
disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary 
impairments, arising out of coal mine employment."111 
102. 147 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1998). 
103. 150 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1998) 
104. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 504; see also§§ 30 U.S.C. 901-945 (1994). 
105. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 504. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. This matter originated in the Fourth Circuit, but was transferred to the Sixth when 
it was discovered that Mr. Seals' condition occurred while he was working as a miner in 
Kentucky. 
109. 938 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1991). 
In Doris Coal, the court held that: 
A mine operator is responsible for the miner's pneumoconiosis if either (I) it is 
determined in an adjudication that the miner is totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis, and is, therefore, entitled to benefits under the [BLBA] or (2) the 
mine operator voluntarily agrees to pay the cost of such treatment by conceding the 
miner's general eligibility. 
Doris Coal, 938 F.2d at 496. (citation omitted). 
110. See 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). 
111. /d. at§ 902 (b). 
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Part B of the [BLBA] provides for monthly cash benefits to the claimants, 
but no health care benefits. Part B claims are paid by the federal government 
and do not involve the mine operators or the [Department of Labor]. 
Part C of the [BLBA], on the other hand establishes an employer-funded 
federal workers compensation program to provide benefits, in cooperation 
with the states, for total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis, and is 
administered by the DOL.112 
273 
According to the Fourth Circuit, there are two elements of liability: the first 
involves whether the coal miner's disability was caused by pneumoconiosis 
and the second surrounds whether the employer/operator is liable for 
individual medical bills. 113 If the first element is met, then there is a 
presumption of responsibility under the second element. 114 
Mr. Seals stopped working in 1972 after sustaining a back injury.m In 
1979, he filed a claim for health benefits under Part C of the Act. Old 
Republic was notified of the claim in 1984, and agreed, without further 
investigation, to pay the cost of black lung related health care. On June 11, 
1984, the DOL issued an award of benefits which stated that Glen Coal was 
required to provide Seals "all reasonable and necessary medical benefits 
required for the treatment of his pneumoconiosis condition.'' 116 The DOL also 
ordered the benefits be made current. Old Republic had owed Seals back pay 
from June 1979 to June 1984. DOL informed Old Republic that Mr. Seals had 
not submitted any bills since June 1979. 111 
In 1985, Old Republic began receiving bills for prescriptions for 
antibiotics and bronchodilators118 for Mr. Seals} 19 Old Republic refused to 
honor the bills, however, contending they were not responsible for the 
antibiotics because pneumoconiosis is not infectious in nature. In 1987, Seals 
submitted the unpaid bills to the DOL. The DOL agreed that although Old 
Republic was correct in their position that they were not obligated to pay for 
112. Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 505 (citations omitted); see also Lute v. Split Vein Coal 
Co.,11 BLR 1-82, 1987 WL 107347, at *2 (DOL Ben. Rev. Bd.). 
113. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 505 (citing Lute, 1987 WL 107347, at *2). 
114. See Lute, 1987 WL 107347, at *2. 
115. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 506. 
116. /d. 
117. See id. at 507. 
118. See id. A bronchodilator is "[A ]ny drug that causes relaxation of bronchial muscle 
resulting in expansion of the air passages of the bronchi." Glen Coal, 147 F.3d. at 507, n.4 
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY). 
119. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 507. 
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the antibiotics, they were nevertheless liable for the bronchodilator bills. Old 
Republic refused again to honor the bills. 120 
The DOL referred the matter to an ALJ as provided for under the statute, 
and the ALJ adopted DOL's position and ordered the payment of the 
bronchodilator bills. 121 As previously stated herein, "[t]he ALJ then noted that 
under the [BLBA ], Seals was required to establish that the medical bills were 
necessary to treat his pneumoconiosis, but held that Seals did not need to 
make any preliminary evidentiary offering."122 
The court of appeals refused to follow the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Doris Coal in this instance, contending instead that the presumption of 
disability under that case "ran afoul" of the meaning and intent of the 
statute. 123 
F. Caney Creek Coal Co. v. Satterjield124 
In Caney Creek, the court ruled that because the coal miner, Raymond 
Satterfield, did not elect review of the denial of his Social Security claim of 
pneumoconiosis, liability for disability benefits properly rested with the coal 
mine operator, rather than the Black Lung Disability Fund ("Fund"). 125 The 
court recognized Congress' intent to streamline benefits to coal miners. 126 "In 
1969, Congress began providing benefits for the survivors of miners who died 
from pneumoconiosis, and also for miners who were totally disabled by the 
disease."127 Congress, in 1972 and again in 1977, liberalized the criteria for 
proving disability. 128 A reading of the BLBA proves the obvious intent of 
Congress. The court of appeals intent, however, appears to narrowly construe 
the Act. 
In 1973, Mr. Satterfield applied to the Social Security Administration 
("SSA") for disability benefits. 129 His claim was denied in November of the 
same year and no further action was taken until May of 1978. His widow then 
pursued his claim after his death in December of 1978, and the DOL 
authorized benefits in August of 1981. Caney Creek appealed this decision 
and both the ALJ and the DOL held in Satterfield's favor, authorizing benefits 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. /d. (citation omitted). 
123. See Glen Coal, 147 F.3d at 507. 
124. 150 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1998). 
125. See Caney Creek, 150 F.3d at 569-70. 
126. See id. at 570. 
127. See id. (citations omitted). 
128. See id. (citations omitted). 
129. See Caney Creek. 150 F.3d at 571. 
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be paid to Mr. Satterfield's estate. 13° Caney Creek then appealed the decision 
of the Board to the court of appeals. 
Caney Creek argued that Satterfield's claim was not filed as a Part B 
claim In addition, Caney Creek asserted that if the DOL was correct in 
categorizing it as such, Satterfield needed not appeal to receive benefits from 
the Fund.131 Caney Creek relied on the following provision: 
[N]o benefits shall be payable by any operator on account of death or total disability 
due to pneumoconiosis ... which was the subject of a claim denied before March 1, 
1978, and which is or has been approved in accordance with the [BLBA ). 132 
According to the plain language of §932( c), Satterfield's benefits should have 
been transferred to the Fund. 
The soundness of this argument fails to consider the DOL's regulations 
that provide a denied Part B claim by the SSA may be revived by an election 
card or "other equivalent document."133 If the ruling of the DOL is a 
permissible construction of the statute, the court is bound to uphold the 
ruling. 134 Surprisingly, the court of appeals did not flex its strength and rule, 
as it so often has in these cases, that the decision of the DOL was 
unreasonable. 
The court of appeals ruled that it was Congress' intent to liberalize 
recovery from pneumoconiosis for coal miners. 135 Since the DOL did not 
stray from the intent of Congress, and the Satterfield's sufficiently adhered to 
the requirements, Caney Creek, and not the Fund, owed Mr. Satterfield's 
widow benefits under the BLBA. 136 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing recitation indicates, there were a few important 
developments in the area of labor and employment law in the Sixth Circuit 
during the 1998 term. While there were clashes between the court and the 
NLRB of the variety that have characterized the Court's posture as to the 
NLRB, especially regarding the criteria of supervisors for collective 
bargaining purposes, there were also cases in which the Court approved the 
Board's position, especially regarding the nature of concerted activity. More 
curious is the court's narrow view regarding coal miners' benefits under the 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 571-72. 
132. 30 U.S.C. § 932(c) (1994). 
133. 20 C.F.R. § 725.496(d) (1999). See also 20 C.F.R. § 410.704(d). 
134. See 30 U.S.C. § 936(a) (1994). 
135. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
136. See Caney Creek. 150 F.3d at 574-75. 
HeinOnline -- 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 276 1999
276 Law Review [2:261 
BLBA. In the end, the Court, for the most part, continued to demonstrate its 
skeptical view of agency positions, according many of them little credence. 
